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Abstract The Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412–418, 1977)
establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two
cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a
general model that covers public goods economies as in Muller–Satterthwaite (J Econ
Theory 14:412–418, 1977) as well as private goods economies. For private goods econ-
omies, we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral
monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check preference domain conditions which
separately guarantee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proof-
ness (Theorem 1) and (ii) strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity
(Theorem 2). We introduce and discuss various classical single-peaked preference
domains and show which of the domain conditions they satisfy (see Propositions 1
and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain some
extensions of the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3. We also
discuss some new “Muller–Satterthwaite preference domains” (e.g., Proposition 3).
1 Introduction
The Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite 1977) states the equiv-
alence between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity, two cornerstone con-
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ditions for the decentralization of (social choice) rules.1 As a consequence of the
Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem, the class of Maskin monotonic rules is fairly small:
only dictatorial rules are strategy-proof.2 However, it is by now well understood that the
aforementioned theorem strongly relies on the assumption of an unrestricted domain
of strict preferences—what we refer to as the Arrovian preference domain. In many
situations though, it is natural to work with more structured preference domains. For
instance, consider a group of agents who have to choose the location of a public facility
on their street. A natural preference domain restriction is to assume that agents have
single-peaked preferences over the possible locations (Black 1948). We know that the
class of strategy-proof rules for this type of economies is large (Moulin 1980); and a
natural question is whether the same conclusion holds for the class of Maskin mono-
tonic rules. So, despite the equivalence provided by the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem,
it seems that for many preference domains and models of interest, the logical relation
between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness is not fully understood. In addi-
tion, notice that in public goods models, a rule selects an alternative at each preference
profile, whereas in private goods models, an allocation will be selected, i.e., a bundle
for each agent. An allocation is an object whose nature is different from an alternative
in several aspects. For instance, the bundle that an agent (or a group of agents) receives
at some preference profile may be conditional on the shape of preferences of some
other agents. Rules that have this feature violate the well-known non-bossiness con-
dition (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein 1981). Because of this difference between the
two models, it is not clear whether there is a “direct” logical relation between Maskin
monotonicity and strategy-proofness in private goods models.
Our contribution: Our goal is to provide a better understanding of the logical rela-
tion between monotonicity conditions and strategy-proofness. We consider a model
that covers public goods as well as private goods economies.3 In addition to Maskin
monotonicity, we introduce a weaker condition called unilateral monotonicity which
pertains to unilateral changes in preferences.4 The use of this condition is pertinent
when we refer to private goods models.
We introduce two easy-to-check preference domain conditions. Condition R1 is a
preference domain richness condition, whereas Condition R2 is a preference domain
restriction condition. A rule defined on a preference domain satisfying Condition R1
is unilaterally monotonic/Maskin monotonic only if it is strategy-proof (Theorem 1
and Corollary 1). Examples of rich preference domains include the Arrovian prefer-
ence domain as well as various single-peaked (single-plateaued) preference domains,
1 Both conditions are central in the mechanism design literature. Strategy-proofness is a necessary condi-
tion for implementation in dominant strategies, whereas Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for
implementation in Nash equilibrium.
2 A version of the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem has as well-known corollary the Gibbard–Satterthwaite
Theorem (see Reny 2001): any onto and strategy-proof rule defined on a domain of unrestricted linear
orderings must be dictatorial.
3 For private goods economies, our model covers both the infinitely divisible goods case as well as the
indivisible goods case.
4 As far as we know, unilateral monotonicity was first introduced by Takamiya (2001).
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but exclude preference domains in which preferences are both single-peaked and
symmetric. More generally, the domain of convex star-shaped preferences satisfies
Condition R1 (Proposition 1). Next, for public goods models, Condition R2 entails
that strategy-proofness implies Maskin monotonicity; and for private goods models,
strategy-proofness implies unilateral monotonicity (Theorem 2). Indeed, in private
goods models, there exist rules that are strategy-proof but not Maskin monotonic.
As argued above, an important difference between public goods and private goods
models turns out to be the existence of rules that violate non-bossiness in the latter.5
As a consequence, for several preference domains, the “set-inclusion connection”
between the class of Maskin monotonic rules and the class of strategy-proof rules may
be lost for private goods models.6 However, when Condition R2 is satisfied, a log-
ical relation between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity can be recovered
thanks to non-bossiness: strategy-proofness and non-bossiness together imply Maskin
monotonicity (Corollary 2). Examples of preference domains satisfying Condition R2
include the Arrovian preference domain as well as some (symmetric) single-peaked
(single-plateaued) preference domains but exclude larger preference domains like the
single-peaked preference domain.7 More generally, any convex norm induced prefer-
ence domain satisfies Condition R2 (Proposition 2).
Next, we come to the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem and its extensions. As a by-
product of our results, we obtain an extended version of the Muller–Satterthwaite
Theorem that applies to the model at hand (Theorem 3). A straightforward corol-
lary is the standard version of the theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite 1977) for the
public goods case, along with a new and direct proof. We then discuss some new
“Muller–Satterthwaite preference domains” of interest (Proposition 3). This shows
that the conclusion of the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem can also spread to restricted
preference domains.
Relation to the literature: The investigation of the relation between monotonicity
conditions and strategy-proofness is not new. A seminal paper dealing with the rela-
tion between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness is Dasgupta et al. (1979).
They introduce a preference domain richness condition and prove that any Maskin
monotonic rule defined on a rich preference domain is strategy-proof. More recently,
Takamiya (2001, 2003) studies the relation between coalition strategy-proofness and
Maskin monotonicity for a broad class of economies with indivisible goods. Takamiya
(2007) generalizes the results obtained in his former two papers. Finally, in an arti-
cle independent of ours, Berga and Moreno (2009) study the relation between strat-
egy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity, and non-bossiness for the single-peaked and
single-plateaued preference domain for the provision of a pure public good.
5 For preference domains satisfying Condition R2, unilateral monotonicity and non-bossiness imply Maskin
monotonicity (Lemma 1).
6 For example, in private goods models, the symmetric single-peaked preference domain admits rules that
are strategy-proof but not Maskin monotonic, as well as rules that are Maskin monotonic but not strategy-
proof.
7 However, the domain of strict single-peaked preferences satisfies Condition R2. In fact, any preference
domain composed only of strict preference relations satisfies Condition R2.
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In addition to Dasgupta et al. (1979), preference domain richness conditions are used
in articles close to ours: Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1997) and Le Breton and Zaporozhets
(2009). Note that the preference domain richness condition (Condition R1) that we
introduce differs from the conditions uncovered in the aforementioned articles, and
it does not imply any “cross-profile” requirements. We discuss in the Appendix the
logical relations between the latter conditions and our Condition R1.
The plan of the article is the following. In Sect. 2, we introduce a general model
that encompasses public goods as well as private goods economies, and we pres-
ent the definitions and preference domains necessary for the article. In Sect. 3,
we define our two preference domain conditions and we prove our main results.
In Sect. 4, we check both these conditions for well-known preference domains.
We also provide an extended version of the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem that
applies to the model at hand. Finally, in the Appendix, we compare our prefer-
ence domain richness condition (Condition R1) to the ones introduced in related
articles.
2 The model, key properties, and preference domains
2.1 The model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents. Let A = A1 × . . .× An be a set of alternatives.
For i ∈ N , we call Ai agent i’s individual set of alternatives. We assume that for all
i, j ∈ N , Ai = A j . Furthermore, we assume that if Ai ⊆ Rm and |Ai | = ∞, then Ai
is convex. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A be an alternative and 1 ≡ (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn . If
alternative x is such that for all i, j ∈ N , xi = x j = α, then we denote x = α1. Next,
let F ⊆ A be the set of feasible alternatives. If for all x ∈ F there exists α such that
x = α1, then the set of feasible alternatives F determines a public goods economy.
Otherwise, the set of feasible alternatives F determines an economy with at least one
private goods component. Hence, our model encompasses public and private goods
economies.
To fix ideas, let us give two examples. It will be clear from these examples that given
the set A of alternatives, the set F of feasible alternatives fully determines whether we
are working with a public or a private goods model. Note that the Cartesian product
notation we use for the set of alternatives is for notational convenience only; none of
our results require it.
Example 1 Let A = {a1, . . . , an} × . . . × {a1, . . . , an}.
Public goods model: Suppose that the agents have to choose one candidate out of the set
{a1, . . . , an} of possible candidates. Then, F = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈ N , xi = x j }.
Private goods model: On the other hand, if agents have to allocate the set of indivisi-
ble objects or tasks {a1, . . . , an} among themselves, then F = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈
N , xi = x j }. 
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Example 2 Let A = [0, 1] × . . . × [0, 1].
Public goods model: Suppose that the agents have to choose a single point in the
interval [0,1] that everyone will consume without rivalry, e.g., a public facility on a
street (see Moulin 1980). Then, F = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈ N , xi = x j }.
Private goods model: On the other hand, if agents have to choose a division of one unit
of an infinitely divisible good among themselves (see Sprumont 1991), then feasibil-
ity is determined by the size of the resource and F = {x ∈ A : for all i ∈ N , xi ≥
0 and
∑
i∈N xi = 1}. 
For all i ∈ N , preferences are represented by a complete, reflexive, and transitive
binary relation Ri over Ai .8 As usual, for all x, y ∈ A, xi Ri yi is interpreted as “i
weakly prefers x to y”, xi Pi yi as “i strictly prefers x to y”, and xi Ii yi as “i is
indifferent between x and y”. Preferences Ri over Ai are strict if for all xi , yi ∈ Ai ,
xi Ri yi implies xi Pi yi or xi = yi .
For public goods models, preferences Ri over the individual set of alternatives Ai
can easily be extended to preferences over the set of alternatives A (since each agent
consumes the same public alternative). Whenever our model captures a private goods
component, we assume that agents only care about their own consumption. Then, for
both public and private goods models, we can easily extend preferences Ri over the
individual set of alternatives Ai to preferences over the set of alternatives A (both
preference relations only depend on agent i’s consumption in Ai ). Therefore, from
now on, we use Ri to describe agent i’s preferences over Ai as well as over A, i.e.,
we use both notations x Ri y and xi Ri yi . Note that for private goods models, strict
preferences over Ai do not need to be strict over A.
For all i ∈ N , we call a set of preferences over Ai , denoted by Ri , a preference
domain. We assume that for all i, j ∈ N , Ri = R j and denote this common preference
domain by R. Let RN denote the set of preference profiles R = (Ri )i∈N such that for
all i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R.
For all i ∈ N , all preference relations Ri ∈ R, and all alternatives x ∈ A, the
lower contour set of Ri at x is L(Ri , x) ≡ {y ∈ A : x Ri y}; the strict lower con-
tour set of Ri at x is SL(Ri , x) ≡ {y ∈ A : x Pi y}; the upper contour set of Ri
at x is U (Ri , x) ≡ {y ∈ A : y Ri x}; and the strict upper contour set of Ri at x is
SU(Ri , x) ≡ {y ∈ A : y Pi x}.
Let the set of alternatives A, the set of feasible alternatives F , and the common
preference domain R be given. Then, a rule ϕ is a function that assigns to every
preference profile R ∈ RN a feasible alternative ϕ(R) ∈ F .
2.2 Properties of rules
We discuss in turn two central properties of the mechanism design literature. First,
strategy-proofness is an incentive property that requires that no agent ever benefits from
misrepresenting his preference relation. In game theoretical terms, a rule is strategy-
8 Note that we do not impose continuity on preferences whenever individual sets of alternatives Ai ⊆ Rm .
However, various preference domains that we consider later contain only continuous preferences.
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proof if in its associated direct revelation game form, it is a weakly dominant strategy
for each agent to announce his true preference relation. By the revelation principle,
strategy-proofness is a necessary condition for dominant strategy implementability.
For agent i ∈ N , preference profile R ∈ RN , and preference relation R′i ∈ R, we
obtain preference profile (R′i , R−i ) by replacing Ri at R by R′i .
Strategy-proofness: A rule ϕ is strategy-proof if for all R ∈ RN , all i ∈ N , and all
R′i ∈ R, ϕ(R) Ri ϕ(R′i , R−i ).
Next, Maskin monotonicity is a property that requires the robustness (or invariance)
of a rule with respect to specific preference changes. A rule ϕ is Maskin monotonic
if an alternative x that is chosen at preference profile R remains chosen at a prefer-
ence profile R′ at which x is considered (weakly) better by all agents. An important
result of the mechanism design literature is that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary
condition for Nash implementability of a rule (see Maskin 1977, 1999). Apart from
its importance for Nash implementability, we consider Maskin monotonicity to be an
appealing property in itself.
In order to introduce Maskin monotonicity, we first define monotonic transforma-
tions. Loosely speaking, for any alternative x and any preference profile R, if at a
preference profile R′ all agents i ∈ N consider alternative x to be (weakly) better,
then R′ is a monotonic transformation of R at x . For preferences Ri , R′i ∈ R and alter-
native x ∈ A, R′i is a monotonic transformation of Ri at x if L(Ri , x) ⊆ L(R′i , x).
By MT(Ri , x) we denote the set of all monotonic transformations of Ri at x and
by MT(R, x) we denote the set of all monotonic transformations of R at x , i.e.,
R′ ∈ MT(R, x) if for all i ∈ N , R′i ∈ MT(Ri , x).
Maskin monotonicity: A rule ϕ is Maskin monotonic if for all R, R′ ∈ RN , x ≡ ϕ(R)
and R′ ∈ MT(R, x) imply ϕ(R′) = x .
For one of our “private goods results”, we use the following weaker monotonic-
ity property: a rule ϕ is unilaterally Maskin monotonic if given that alternative x is
chosen at preference profile R, agent i’s component xi remains chosen at a unilat-
eral deviation profile R′ = (R′i , R−i ) at which agent i considers xi to be (weakly)
better.
Unilateral monotonicity: A rule ϕ is unilaterally monotonic if for all R ∈ RN , all
i ∈ N , and all R′i ∈ R, x ≡ ϕ(R) and R′i ∈ MT(Ri , x) imply ϕi (R′i , R−i ) = xi .
Note that Maskin monotonicity implies unilateral monotonicity. To be more pre-
cise, for public goods economies, Maskin monotonicity and unilateral monotonicity
are equivalent and for private goods economies Maskin monotonicity implies unilat-
eral monotonicity. However, the converse does not hold as shown in Example 7 in
Sect. 3.
We close this section by introducing non-bossiness (in allocations) (see Satterth-
waite and Sonnenschein 1981), an auxiliary property that we use for some of our
“private goods results”. The property states that, by changing his preference relation,
an agent cannot change components of the allocation for the other agents without
affecting his own. Obviously, this property is vacuous in a public goods model.
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Non-bossiness: A rule ϕ is non-bossy if for all R ∈ RN , all i ∈ N , and all R′i ∈ R,
ϕi (R) = ϕi (R′i , R−i ) implies that ϕ(R) = ϕ(R′i , R−i ).
For private goods models, Maskin monotonicity implies non-bossiness under our
rich preference domain condition (Condition R1), while the converse is not true. On
the other hand, the conjunction of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness is equivalent
to Maskin monotonicity under our preference domain restriction condition (Condi-
tion R2). These relations will be made clear in Sect. 3.
2.3 Well-known preference domains
2.3.1 The Arrovian preference domain
By RA we denote the preference domain that contains all strict preferences over Ai .
We call this “unrestricted strict” domain of preferences RA the Arrovian preference
domain.
2.3.2 One-dimensional single-peaked and single-plateaued preferences
Here, we introduce the general single-peaked preference domain and several of its well-
known preference subdomains. We start by defining the smallest preference domain
we consider, the symmetric single-peaked preference domain (e.g., Border and Jordan
1983).
Symmetric single-peaked preferences over Ai ⊆ R: Preferences Ri over Ai ⊆ R
are symmetrically single-peaked if there exists a point p(Ri ) ∈ Ai such that for all
xi , yi ∈ Ai , xi Ri yi if and only if |p(Ri ) − xi | ≤ |p(Ri ) − yi |. We call p(Ri ) the
peak (alternative) of Ri . We refer to the set of all symmetric single-peaked preferences
(over Ai ) as the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences (over Ai ).
Note that a symmetric single-peaked preference relation Ri is completely deter-
mined by it’s peak. By relaxing the symmetry assumption, one obtains the domain of
single-peaked preferences (e.g., Black 1948; Moulin 1980).
Single-peaked preferences over Ai ⊆ R: Preferences Ri over Ai ⊆ R are
single-peaked if there exists a point p(Ri ) ∈ Ai such that for all xi , yi ∈
Ai satisfying either yi < xi ≤ p(Ri ) or p(Ri ) ≤ xi < yi , xi Pi yi .
We call p(Ri ) the peak (alternative) of Ri . We refer to the set of all single-
peaked preferences (over Ai ) as the domain of single-peaked preferences (over
Ai ).
We now introduce two superdomains of the single-peaked preference domain (i.e.,
each of the following two preference domains contains the set of all single-peaked
preferences). First, consider again the location of a public facility on a street. As in
Example 2, we assume that agents’ preferences are single-peaked, but that in addition
they have an outside option so that if the public facility is too far away, they will not
use it. This class of preferences is introduced and analyzed by Cantala (2004).
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Single-peaked preferences over Ai ⊆ R reflecting an outside option: Preferences
Ri over Ai ⊆ R are single-peaked and reflect an outside option if there exists an inter-
val [a, b] ⊆ Ai and a point p(Ri ) ∈ (a, b) such that (i) Ri is single-peaked on [a, b]
with peak p(Ri ); (ii) for all xi ∈ (a, b) and yi ∈ Ai \ [a, b], xi Pi yi ; and (iii) for all
xi , yi ∈ Ai \ (a, b), xi Ii yi . We refer to the set of all single-peaked preferences (over
Ai ) reflecting an outside option as the domain of single-peaked preferences (over Ai )
reflecting an outside option or the Cantala preference domain (over Ai ) for short.
The second superdomain of the single-peaked preference domain frequently
encountered in the literature (see Moulin 1984) is the so-called single-plateaued pref-
erence domain. For such a preference domain, we allow agents to have an interval of
best points, so that instead of the peak we have a plateau.
Single-plateaued preferences over Ai ⊆ R: Preferences Ri over Ai ⊆ R are single-
plateaued if there exists an interval [p(Ri ), p(Ri )] ⊆ Ai such that (i) for all xi , yi ∈
[p(Ri ), p(Ri )], xi Ii yi ; (ii) for all xi ∈ [p(Ri ), p(Ri )] and all yi ∈ Ai\[p(Ri ), p(Ri )],
xi Pi yi ; and (iii) for all xi , yi ∈ Ai \[p(Ri ), p(Ri )] satisfying either yi < xi ≤ p(Ri )
or p(Ri ) ≤ xi < yi , xi Pi yi . We call [p(Ri ), p(Ri )] the plateau (of alternatives) of
Ri . We refer to the set of all single-plateaued preferences (over Ai ) as the domain of
single-plateaued preferences (over Ai ).
Note that the definition above only allows for a unique closed interval of indifferent
alternatives, namely the plateau of best alternatives. Dasgupta et al. (1979), DHM for
short, consider an even more general preference domain (which they call the single-
peaked preference domain) by allowing for additional closed intervals of indifferent
alternatives left and right from the “top-plateau”.
DHM preferences over Ai ⊆ R: Preferences Ri over Ai ⊆ R are DHM prefer-
ences if there exists an interval [p(Ri ), p(Ri )] ⊆ Ai such that (i) for all xi , yi ∈
[p(Ri ), p(Ri )], xi Ii yi ; (ii) for all xi ∈ [p(Ri ), p(Ri )] and all yi ∈ Ai\[p(Ri ), p(Ri )],
xi Pi yi ; and (iii) for all xi , yi ∈ Ai \[p(Ri ), p(Ri )] satisfying either yi < xi ≤ p(Ri )
or p(Ri ) ≤ xi < yi , then xi Ri yi . We refer to the set of all DHM preferences (over
Ai ) as the DHM preference domain (over Ai ).
Set-relationships between one-dimensional single-peaked and single-plateaued
preferences are depicted in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 Set-relationships
between one-dimensional
single-peaked preference
domains
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2.3.3 Higher-dimensional single-peaked preferences
There are various extensions of the one-dimensional single-peaked preference domains
to higher dimensions. We start again by defining the smallest preference domains first.
The first two preference domains are extensions of the one-dimensional symmetric sin-
gle-peaked preferences introduced before (see Border and Jordan 1983). The domain
of symmetric single-peaked preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm is induced by the Euclidean
norm ‖·‖E .
Symmetric single-peaked (Euclidean) preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm: Preferences Ri
over Ai ⊆ Rm are symmetrically single-peaked (or Euclidean) if there exists a point
p(Ri ) ∈ Ai such that for all xi , yi ∈ Ai , xi Ri yi if and only if ‖p(Ri ) − xi‖E ≤
‖p(Ri ) − yi‖E . We call p(Ri ) the peak (alternative) of Ri . We refer to the set of all
symmetric single-peaked (Euclidean) preferences (over Ai ) as the domain of symmet-
ric single-peaked (Euclidean) preferences (over Ai ).
Note that for symmetric single-peaked preferences, upper contour sets are spheres.
The following preference domain loosely speaking extends the symmetric preference
domain to also allow for ellipsoids as upper contour sets (with axes that are parallel
to the coordinate axes).
Separable quadratic preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm: Preferences Ri over Ai ⊆ Rm are
separable quadratic if there exists a point p(Ri ) ∈ Ai , scalars α1(Ri ), . . . , αm(Ri ) >
0, and a utility representation ui of Ri such that for all xi ∈ Ai , ui (xi ) =
−∑mk=1
(
αk(Ri )(xi,k − pk(Ri )
)2
. Note that if for all g, h such that 1 ≤ g, h ≤ m,
αg(Ri ) = αh(Ri ), then preferences Ri are symmetrically single-peaked over Ai ⊆
R
m
. We call p(Ri ) the peak (alternative) of Ri . We refer to the set of all separable
quadratic preferences (over Ai ) as the domain of separable quadratic preferences
(over Ai ).
In order to introduce the next preference domain, we need some definitions and
notation. We define the convex hull of two points xi , yi ∈ Rm by conv(xi , yi ) = {zi ∈
R
m : there exists t ∈ [0, 1] such that zi = t xi + (1 − t)yi }. Let ‖ · ‖ be a strictly
convex norm, i.e.,
(i) for all xi ∈ Rm , ‖xi‖ ≥ 0, (positivity)
(ii) for all xi ∈ Rm , ‖xi‖ = 0 if and only if xi = 0, (positive definiteness)
(iii) for all xi ∈ Rm and α ∈ R, ‖αxi‖ = |α| ‖xi‖, (positive homogeneity)
(iv) for all xi , yi ∈ Rm , ‖xi‖ + ‖yi‖ ≥ ‖xi + yi‖, (triangular inequality)
(v) for all xi , yi , zi ∈ Rm , (strict convexity)
‖xi − yi‖ + ‖yi − zi‖ = ‖xi − zi‖
if and only if yi ∈ conv(xi , zi ).
Note that the requirement of strict convexity means that any sphere of positive
radius does not contain any line segment that is not reduced to a point. Our defini-
tion of strict convexity for norms is based on Papadopoulos (2005, Proposition 7.2.1),
which also lists various equivalent conditions for the strict convexity of a norm. For
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instance, the so-called p norm ‖ · ‖p over Ai ⊆ Rm is strictly convex for any p > 1
(see Papadopoulos 2005, Proposition 7.3.2).9
The following preference domain includes the two previously introduced prefer-
ence domains.
Preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm that are induced by a strictly convex norm ‖ · ‖: Pref-
erences Ri over Ai ⊆ Rm are induced by a strictly convex norm ‖ · ‖ if there exists a
point p(Ri ) ∈ Ai such that for all xi , yi ∈ Ai , xi Ri yi if and only if ‖p(Ri ) − xi‖ ≤
‖p(Ri ) − yi‖. We call p(Ri ) the peak (alternative) of Ri . We refer to the set of all
preferences (over Ai ) that are induced by a strictly convex norm as the domain of
preferences (over Ai ) that are induced by a strictly convex norm.
Finally, we introduce the most general higher-dimensional single-peaked prefer-
ence domain that we are aware of [see Border and Jordan (1983)]. These preferences
are called star-shaped by Border and Jordan (1983) because upper contour sets can
have the shape of a star and look as follows .
Star-shaped preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm: Preferences Ri over Ai ⊆ Rm are star-
shaped if there exists a point p(Ri ) ∈ Ai such that for all xi ∈ Ai \ {p(Ri )} and all
λ ∈ (0, 1), p(Ri ) Pi [λxi + (1 − λ)p(Ri )] Pi xi . We call p(Ri ) the peak (alternative)
of Ri . We refer to the set of all star-shaped preferences (over Ai ) as the domain of
star-shaped preferences (over Ai ).
Note that star-shaped preferences Ri are characterized by the fact that the restriction
of Ri to each line passing through the peak p(Ri ) is one-dimensionally single-peaked.
If in addition to star-shapedness we require convexity of preferences, we obtain the
following class of preferences.
Convex star-shaped preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm: Preferences Ri over Ai ⊆ Rm are
convex star-shaped if they are star-shaped and for all x ∈ A, U (Ri , x) is a convex
set.10 We refer to the set of all convex star-shaped preferences (over Ai ) as the domain
of convex star-shaped preferences (over Ai ).
Set-relationships between higher-dimensional single-peaked preference domains
are as follows: symmetric single-peaked domain ⊂ separable quadratic domain ⊂
convex norm induced domain ⊂ convex star-shaped domain ⊂ star-shaped domain.
3 Monotonicity and strategy-proofness
3.1 Rich preference domains: monotonicity implies strategy-proofness
For i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R, by b(Ri ), we denote agent i’s best alternatives in A, i.e.,
b(Ri ) ≡ {x ∈ A : for all y ∈ A, x Ri y}. To establish our first result, we introduce
the following preference domain “richness” condition.
9 For p > 1 and x ∈ Rm , ‖x‖p =
(∑m
j=1 |x j |
) 1
p
. For p = 1 and x ∈ Rm , ‖x‖1 =
∑m
j=1 |x j |; the
associated 1 (or taxicab) norm is not strictly convex.
10 Alternatively, preferences Ri over Ai are convex star-shaped if they are star-shaped and for all xi , yi ∈ Ai
and λ ∈ [0, 1], xi Ri yi implies λxi + (1 − λ)yi Ri yi .
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Condition R1: Let i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R, and x, y ∈ A be such that y Pi x . Then, there
exists R′i ∈ R such that y ∈ b(R′i ) and L(Ri , x) ⊆ L(R′i , x).11
Remark 1 Note that Condition R1 is different from Dasgupta et al.’s (1979) or Fleur-
baey and Maniquet’s (1997) preference domain richness conditions. Our condition
involves one preference relation Ri while the other two richness conditions are based
on conditions involving two preference relations Ri and R′i . The preference domain
richness condition closest to ours seems to be the one introduced by Le Breton and
Zaporozhets (2009). We briefly state and discuss the relation between these richness
conditions in more detail in Appendix A. 
Examples of rich preference domains satisfying Condition R1 are the Arrovian
preference domain, the single-peaked preference domain over Ai ⊆ R, and more gen-
erally the convex star-shaped preference domain over Ai ⊆ Rm (see Proposition 1).
We will check if the preference domains introduced above satisfy Condition R1 in
Sect. 4 and give a short survey in Table 1.
Theorem 1 Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R1 and let rule ϕ be defined
on RN . If ϕ is unilaterally monotonic, then it is strategy-proof.
Proof Suppose ϕ is unilaterally monotonic, but not strategy-proof. Then, there exist
R ∈ RN , i ∈ N , and R¯i ∈ R such that ϕ(R¯i , R−i ) Pi ϕ(R). Denote ϕ(R) = x and
ϕ(R¯i , R−i ) = y. Hence, yi Pi xi and by Condition R1 there exists R′i ∈ R such that
y ∈ b(R′i ) and L(Ri , x) ⊆ L(R′i , x). Thus, R′i ∈ MT(R¯i , y) and R′i ∈ MT(Ri , x).
By unilateral monotonicity, ϕi (R′i , R−i ) = yi and ϕi (R′i , R−i ) = xi . Hence, xi = yi ;
contradicting our assumption that yi Pi xi . unionsq
Corollary 1 Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R1 and let rule ϕ be
defined on RN . If ϕ is Maskin monotonic, then it is strategy-proof.
We demonstrate for the public as well as for the private goods case that strategy-
proofness does not necessarily imply unilateral/Maskin monotonicity; the notation
“unilateral/Maskin monotonicity” indicates that the corresponding statement holds
for “unilateral monotonicity as well as for Maskin monotonicity”. For both examples,
we use the domain of single-peaked preferences (over Ai = [0, 1]), which satisfies
Condition R1 (this follows from Proposition 1).
Example 3 We consider Moulin (1980) model as introduced in Example 2. Thus, for
all i ∈ N , Ai = [0, 1], F = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈ N , xi = x j }, and R is the domain
of single-peaked preferences over Ai . Let c1, c2 ∈ [0, 1], c1 < c2, and k ∈ N . Then,
for all R ∈ RN ,
ϕ(R) ≡
{
c11 if c1 Pk c2 or if c1 Ik c2 and p(Rk) ∈ Q;
c21 if c2 Pk c1 or if c1 Ik c2 and p(Rk) ∈ Q.
It is easy to see that ϕ is strategy-proof, but not unilateral/Maskin monotonic. 
11 Note that in the proof of Theorem 1 and in all results concerning single-peaked preference domains, we
could strengthen Condition R1 by requiring L(Ri , x) = L(R′i , x) instead of L(Ri , x) ⊆ L(R′i , x).
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Example 4 We consider Sprumont (1991) model as introduced in Example 2. Thus,
for all i ∈ N , Ai = [0, 1], F = {x ∈ A : for all i ∈ N , xi ≥ 0 and ∑i∈N xi = 1},
and R is the domain of single-peaked preferences over Ai . Note that in this model, a
two agents division problem corresponds to a two agents location problem in Moulin
(1980) model. Hence, by adapting the rule of Example 3, we can construct a strategy-
proof rule ϕ′ that is not unilaterally/Maskin monotonic for Sprumont (1991) model as
follows. Let c1, c2 ∈ [0, 1], c1 < c2, k ∈ N , and ϕ be the rule defined in Example 3.
Let j ∈ N \ {k}. Then for all R ∈ RN , ϕ′k(R) = ϕk(R), ϕ′j (R) = 1 − ϕk(R), and for
all i ∈ N \ { j, k}, ϕ′i (R) = 0. 
3.2 Restricted preference domains: strategy-proofness implies monotonicity
To establish our second result, we introduce the following preference domain “restric-
tion” condition.
Condition R2: Let i ∈ N , Ri , R′i ∈ R, and x ∈ A be such that R′i ∈ MT(Ri , x) and
R′i = Ri . Then, for all y ∈ L(Ri , x) ∩ U (R′i , x), yi = xi .
Examples of restricted preference domains satisfying Condition R2 are the Arro-
vian preference domain (and any domain containing only strict preference relations),
the symmetric single-peaked preference domain over Ai ⊆ R, the separable qua-
dratic preference domain over Ai ⊆ Rm , and more generally any strictly convex
norm induced preference domain (see Proposition 2). We state two straightforward
consequences concerning Condition R2 in the following remark.
Remark 2 If a preference domain R satisfies Condition R2, then any preference
domain R˜ ⊂ R satisfies Condition R2. If a preference domain R only contains
strict preferences, then R satisfies Condition R2. 
We will check if the preference domains introduced above satisfy Condition R2 in
Sect. 4 and give a short survey in Table 1.
Theorem 2 Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R2 and let rule ϕ be defined
on RN .
(a) If ϕ is strategy-proof, then it is unilaterally monotonic.
(b) Let F determine a public goods economy. If ϕ is strategy-proof, then it is Maskin
monotonic.
Proof (a) Suppose ϕ is strategy-proof, but not unilaterally monotonic. Then, there
exist R ∈ RN , i ∈ N , and R′i ∈ R such that ϕ(R) = x , R′i ∈ MT(Ri , x),
and ϕi (R′i , R−i ) = yi = xi . By strategy-proofness, x Ri y and y R′i x . Thus,
y ∈ L(Ri , x) and y ∈ U (R′i , x). Hence, y ∈ L(Ri , x) ∩ U (R′i , x) and yi = xi ;
a contradiction with Condition R2.
(b) Because unilateral monotonicity and Maskin monotonicity coincide for public
goods economies, this implication follows from (a). unionsq
We demonstrate for the public as well as for the private goods case that unilat-
eral/Maskin monotonicity does not necessarily imply strategy-proofness. For both
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examples, we use the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, which satisfies
Condition R2 (this follows from Proposition 2).
Example 5 We consider Moulin (1980) model as described in Examples 2 and 3,
but with symmetric single-peaked preferences. Thus, for all i ∈ N , Ai = [0, 1],
F = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈ N , xi = x j }, and R is the domain of symmetric single-
peaked preferences over Ai . Let c1, c2 ∈ [0, 1], c1 < c2, and k ∈ N . Then, for all
R ∈ RN ,
ϕ(R) ≡
{
p(Rk)1 if p(Rk) ≤ c1;
c21 otherwise.
It is easy to see that ϕ is unilaterally/Maskin monotonic, but not strategy-proof. 
Example 6 We consider Sprumont (1991) model discussed in Examples 2 and 4,
but with symmetric single-peaked preferences. Thus, for all i ∈ N , Ai = [0, 1],
F = {x ∈ A : for all i ∈ N , xi ≥ 0 and ∑i∈N xi = 1}, and R is the domain of
symmetric single-peaked preferences over Ai . Similarly as in Example 4, we can adapt
the rule of Example 5 to construct a unilaterally/Maskin monotonic rule ϕ′ that is not
strategy-proof. Let c1, c2 ∈ [0, 1], c1 < c2, k ∈ N , and ϕ be the rule defined in Exam-
ple 5. Let j ∈ N \ {k}. Then for all R ∈ RN , ϕ′k(R) = ϕk(R), ϕ′j (R) = 1 − ϕk(R),
and for all i ∈ N \ { j, k}, ϕ′i (R) = 0. 
The following example demonstrates that for private goods economies Condi-
tion R2 and strategy-proofness do not necessarily imply Maskin monotonicity (hence,
Theorem 2 (b) cannot be extended to private goods economies). We use the domain
of separable quadratic preferences, which satisfies Condition R2 (this follows from
Proposition 2).
Example 7 We consider a two-dimensional extension of Sprumont (1991) model with
separable quadratic preferences. Thus, for all i ∈ N , Ai = [0, 1]2 , F = {x ∈ A :
for all i ∈ N , xi ≥ 01 and ∑i∈N xi = 11}, and R is the domain of separable
quadratic preferences over Ai . Let c ∈ [0, 1)2. We define ϕ as follows. First, for
all R ∈ RN , ϕ1(R) = c. Second, if R1 is symmetric, then ϕ2(R) = 11 − c and
ϕ3(R) = 0, and otherwise, ϕ2(R) = 0 and ϕ3(R) = 11− c. It is easy to see that ϕ is
strategy-proof, unilaterally monotonic, but not Maskin monotonic. 
Theorem 2 as well as Examples 6 and 7 show an important difference between
public goods and private goods models. For the former, and for almost all the pref-
erence domains we cover12, the class of Maskin monotonic rules is either a subset, a
superset, or coincides with the class of strategy-proof rules (see Table 1). In the private
goods case, this “set-inclusion connection” between the class of Maskin monotonic
rules and the class of strategy-proof rules is lost for some preference domains, e.g.,
the symmetric single-peaked preference domain for which there exist rules that are
Maskin monotonic but not strategy-proof, as well as rules that are strategy-proof but
not Maskin monotonic.
12 An exception is the star-shaped preference domain.
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A key feature of Example 7 is that ϕ violates non-bossiness. With the next lemma
we can show easily that Theorem 2 (b) can be extended to private goods economies if
non-bossiness is added.
Lemma 1 Let A and F be given. Let rule ϕ be defined on RN . If ϕ is unilaterally
monotonic and non-bossy, then it is Maskin monotonic.
Proof Suppose that ϕ is unilaterally monotonic and non-bossy. Let R ∈ RN , i ∈ N ,
and R′i ∈ R be such that ϕ(R) = x and R′i ∈ MT(Ri , x). Then, by unilateral mono-
tonicity, ϕi (R′i , R−i ) = xi . Hence, by non-bossiness, ϕ(R′i , R−i ) = x . The proof that
for all R, R′ ∈ RN such that R′ ∈ MT(R, x), ϕ(R) = ϕ(R′) = x follows from an
iteration of the previous arguments (by switching agents one by one from Ri to R′i ).
Hence, ϕ is Maskin monotonic. unionsq
Corollary 2 Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R2 and let rule ϕ be
defined on RN . If ϕ is strategy-proof and non-bossy, then it is Maskin monotonic.
4 Rich preference domains, restricted preference domains,
and the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem
We now analyze which of our preference domains are rich and which are restricted.
4.1 Condition R1: rich preference domains
It is clear from Examples 5 and 6 that the domain of symmetric single-peaked prefer-
ences violates Condition R1. We show below that the domain of convex star-shaped
preference is rich.
Proposition 1 The domain of convex star-shaped preferences satisfies Condition R1.
The following notation for star-shaped preferences is useful in the proof of Prop-
osition 1. Let Ri be a star-shaped preference relation and assume that xi ∈ Ai \
{p(Ri )}. Then, for all zi ∈ Ai such that zi Ri xi there exists x ′i ∈ Ai , x ′i Ii xi and
λ(Ri ; xi , zi ) ∈ [0, 1] such that zi = λ(Ri ; xi , zi )p(Ri ) + (1 − λ(Ri ; xi , zi ))x ′i . Note
that if λ(Ri ; xi , zi ) = 0, then zi Ii xi and if λ(Ri ; xi , zi ) = 1, then zi = p(Ri ) Pi xi .
Proof Let Ri be a convex star-shaped preference relation and assume that x, y ∈ A
such that y Pi x . In order to verify Condition R1, we construct convex star-shaped
preferences R′i such that y ∈ b(R′i ) and L(Ri , x) ⊆ L(R′i , x). If yi = p(Ri ), then we
are done by choosing R′i = Ri . Thus, we assume that yi = p(Ri ).
Loosely speaking, we construct R′i by “lifting yi up” to become the peak of a new
preference relation R′i such that preferences over L(Ri , x) do not change. To be more
precise, we construct preferences R′i as follows:
(i) yi = p(R′i ), i.e., yi is the peak of R′i ;
(ii) for all z, z′ ∈ L(Ri , x), z Ri z′ if and only if z R′i z′, i.e., preferences on L(Ri , x)
do not change;
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(iii) for all z ∈ U (Ri , x) and z′ ∈ SL(Ri , x), z P ′i z′, i.e., preferences between
U (Ri , x) and SL(Ri , x) do not change;
(iv) for all z, z′ ∈ U (Ri , x), z R′i z′ if and only if λ(R′i ; xi , zi ) ≥ λ(R′i ; xi , z′i ), i.e.,
we parameterize all z, z′ ∈ U (Ri , x) using line segments from the indifference
set Ii (Ri , xi ) = {x ′i ∈ Ai : x ′i Ii xi } to the peak p(R′i ) = yi and λ(R′i ; xi , ·).
Note that by (i) and (iv), b(R′i ) = {y} and by (ii), L(Ri , x) = L(R′i , x) (in particu-
lar, Ii (Ri , xi ) = Ii (R′i , xi )). Next, we prove that convex star-shapedness is preserved
by our construction of R′i from Ri .
First, we show that star-shapedness is preserved when going from Ri to R′i . Let
w, z ∈ A, and λ ∈ (0, 1) be such that wi , zi ∈ Ai \ {p(R′i )} and zi = λyi + (1−λ)wi .
We prove that zi P ′i wi . We have two cases to consider:
Case 1. w ∈ SL(Ri , x)
Hence, (a) w, z ∈ SL(Ri , x) or (b) [w ∈ SL(Ri , x) and z ∈ U (Ri , x)]. For (a),
since yi Pi wi , by convexity, zi Ri wi . Suppose, by contradiction, that zi Ii wi . Since,
yi Pi wi there exists w′ ∈ A with w′i Ii wi and such that yi = λ¯p(Ri )+ (1 − λ¯)w′i for
some λ¯ ∈ (0, 1). If w′i = wi or w′i = zi , then we are done.13 So suppose that w′i is
distinct from wi and zi . Since, zi = λwi + (1 − λ)yi and yi = λ¯p(Ri ) + (1 − λ¯)w′i ,
we obtain
zi = λwi + (1 − λ)[λ¯p(Ri ) + (1 − λ¯)w′i ]
= λwi + (1 − λ)(1 − λ¯)w′i + (1 − λ)λ¯p(Ri ).
Let v ∈ A be such that vi is the following convex combination of wi , w′i , and zi :
vi = λwi + (1 − λ)(1 − λ¯)w′i + (1 − λ)λ¯zi .
By convexity, vi Ri zi Ii wi Ii w′i . Notice that zi − (1 − λ)λ¯p(Ri ) = vi − (1 − λ)λ¯zi .
Therefore,
zi = 1
(1 + (1 − λ)λ¯) vi +
(1 − λ)λ¯
(1 + (1 − λ)λ¯) p(Ri ) = λ˜vi + (1 − λ˜)p(Ri )
with λ˜ = 1
(1+(1−λ)λ¯) ∈ (0, 1). Hence, by star-shapedness of Ri , zi Pi vi , contradicting
vi Ri zi . Therefore, zi Pi wi and by the construction of R′i [see (ii)], it follows that
zi P ′i wi .
For (b), w ∈ SL(Ri , x), z ∈ U (Ri , x), and the construction of R′i [see (iii)] imply
zi P ′i wi .
13 If w′i = wi or w′i = zi , then for some λ∗ ∈ (0, 1), zi = λ∗wi + (1 − λ∗)p(Ri ) and by star-shapedness,
zi Pi wi .
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Case 2. w ∈ U (Ri , xi )
Hence, by the convex star-shapedness of Ri , zi Pi wi and z ∈ SU(Ri , xi ). Thus,
λ(R′i ; xi , zi ) > λ(R′i ; xi , wi ). Hence, by construction of R′i [see (iv)], this implies
zi P ′i wi .
Second, we show that convexity is preserved when going from Ri to R′i . Instead of
the standard definition of convex preferences given in Footnote 10, it is well known
that convexity of preferences can be defined via the convexity of upper contour sets.
Recall that we do not change preferences on L(Ri , x). An immediate implication is
that for each y′ ∈ L(R′i , x), U (R′i , y′) is a convex set. Therefore, to show our claim,
we only need to consider upper contour sets for points that are in SU(Ri , x). Hence,
let v,w ∈ SU(R′i , x), v = w, v I ′i w, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that zi = αvi + (1 − α)wi .
We have to show that z R′i v I ′i w. By construction of R′i (see (iv)), this implies that
we have to prove
λ(R′i ; xi , zi ) ≥ λ(R′i ; xi , vi ) = λ(R′i ; xi , wi ). (1)
Note that v,w ∈ SU(R′i , x) and v = w imply that 1 > λ(R′i ; xi , vi ) =
λ(R′i ; xi , wi ) > 0.
Let zˆi = αv′i + (1 − α)w′i . There exist v′, w′, z′ ∈ A such that v′i Ii w′i Ii z′i Ii xi
(recall that Ii (Ri , xi ) = Ii (R′i , xi )), vi = λ(R′i ; xi , vi )yi +(1−λ(R′i ; xi , vi ))v′i , wi =
λ(R′i ; xi , wi )yi+(1−λ(R′i ; xi , wi ))w′i , and zˆi = λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi )yi+(1−λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ))z′i .
By convexity, zˆ R′i v′ I ′i w′. By construction of R′i [see (iv)], λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ) ≥
λ(R′i ; xi , v′i ) = λ(R′i ; xi , w′i ) = 0.
Next, we can derive zi = [λ(R′i ; xi , vi )+λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi )−λ(R′i ; xi , vi )λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi )]yi
+ [(1 − λ(R′i ; xi , vi ))(1 − λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ))]z′i .14 Since, zi = λ(R′i ; xi , zi )yi + (1 −
λ(R′i ; xi , zi ))z′i , it follows that λ(R′i ; xi , zi ) = λ(R′i ; xi , vi ) + λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ) −
λ(R′i ; xi , vi )λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ). Hence, 1 > λ(R′i ; xi , vi ) > 0 and λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ) ≥ 0 imply
⇔ λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ) ≥ λ(R′i ; xi , vi )λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi )⇔ λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ) − λ(R′i ; xi , vi )λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ) ≥ 0⇔ λ(R′i ; xi , vi ) + λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ) − λ(R′i ; xi , vi )
λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ) ≥ λ(R′i ; xi , vi )⇔ λ(R′i ; xi , zi ) ≥ λ(R′i ; xi , vi ).
Hence, the desired inequality (1) holds and we have proven convexity of the preference
relation R′i . unionsq
Corollary 3 Let A such that for all i ∈ N, Ai ⊆ Rm and F be given. Let R be the
domain of all convex star-shaped preferences and let rule ϕ be defined on RN . If ϕ is
Maskin monotonic, then it is strategy-proof.
14 For completeness, zi = αvi + (1 − α)wi = α[λ(R′i ; xi , vi )yi + (1 − λ(R′i ; xi , vi ))v′i ] + (1 −
α)[λ(R′i ; xi , vi )yi + (1 − λ(R′i ; xi , vi ))w′i ] = λ(R′i ; xi , vi )yi + (1 − λ(R′i ; xi , vi ))[αv′i + (1 − α)w′i ] =
λ(R′i ; xi , vi )yi + (1 − λ(R′i ; xi , vi ))zˆi = λ(R′i ; xi , vi )yi + (1 − λ(R′i ; xi , vi ))[λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi )yi + (1 −
λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ))z′i ] = [λ(R′i ; xi , vi )+λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi )−λ(R′i ; xi , vi )λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi )]yi +[(1−λ(R′i ; xi , vi ))(1−
λ(R′i ; xi , zˆi ))]z′i .
123
Monotonicity and strategy-proofness 57
Fig. 2 Star-shaped non-convex
preferences that do not satisfy
Condition R1
The following example demonstrates that convexity of preferences is a necessary
assumption for star-shaped preferences to satisfy Condition R1.
Example 8 Let A = [0, 1]2 × . . . × [0, 1]2 and let R be the domain of star-shaped
preferences. In Fig. 2, we depict a preference relation Ri over Ai = R2+ with peak
p(Ri ) and with a non-convex upper contour set at xi ∈ Ai (marked by the indifference
curve through xi ). It is easy to see that there does not exist R′i ∈ R with yi = p(R′i )
and L(Ri , x) ⊆ L(R′i , x). Indeed, for any such R′i , star-shapedness implies that for
all z′ ∈ A with z′i = zi , z ∈ SU (R′i , x) while Condition R1 implies that z ∈ L(R′i , x);
a contradiction. Thus Condition R1 is violated. 
Since, the single-peaked preference domain (over Ai ⊆ R) is the one-dimensional
equivalent of convex star-shaped preferences, Proposition 1 implies that also the one-
dimensional single-peaked preference domain satisfies Condition R1. More generally,
the following holds.
Remark 3 Let R be a preference domain formed by convex preferences that contains
the domain of convex star-shaped preferences. Note that for such a preference domain
R, we can simply replicate the proof of Proposition 1 by noting that the preference
relation R′i defined in the proof is convex star-shaped. Hence, preference domain R
satisfies Condition R1. As demonstrated by Example 8, the convexity assumption can-
not be dropped.
In particular, the domain of single-peaked preferences (over Ai ⊆ R), the domain
of single-peaked preferences (over Ai ⊆ R) reflecting an outside option, the domain
of single-plateaued preferences (over Ai ⊆ R), and the domain of DHM preferences
(over Ai ⊆ R) all satisfy Condition R1. 
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4.2 Condition R2: restricted preference domains
It is clear from Examples 3 and 4 that general single-peaked preferences violate Con-
dition R2. We show below that all preferences that are induced by a strictly convex
norm satisfy R2.
Proposition 2 The domain of preferences that are induced by a strictly convex norm
satisfies Condition R2.
Proof Let ‖ · ‖ be a strictly convex norm and Ri , R′i be preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm
induced by ‖ · ‖. Furthermore, let x ∈ A be such that R′i ∈ MT(Ri , x) and R′i = Ri .
Note that then p(Ri ) = p(R′i ). Let y ∈ L(Ri , x) ∩ U (R′i , x). Since R′i ∈ MT(Ri , x),
y ∈ L(R′i , x) ∩ U (R′i , x). Hence, yi I ′i xi and
‖p(R′i ) − yi‖ = ‖p(R′i ) − xi‖. (2)
Furthermore, y ∈ L(Ri , x) implies
‖p(Ri ) − yi‖ ≥ ‖p(Ri ) − xi‖. (3)
Consider line(p(Ri ), p(R′i )) = {zi ∈ Rm : there exists t ∈ R such that zi = t xi +
(1 − t)yi }. Then, there exist two distinct points zˆi , z˜i ∈ line(p(Ri ), p(R′i )) such that
zˆi Ii xi and z˜i Ii xi (possibly zˆi = xi or z˜i = xi ). Note that we can give an orientation
to the line such that one of these points is to the left of p(Ri ) and the other is to the
right of p(Ri ). Without loss of generality, assume that p(R′i ) and z˜i are to the right of
p(Ri ). Since, R′i ∈ MT(Ri , x), z˜i Ii xi implies z˜i ∈ L(R′i , x) and
‖p(R′i ) − z˜i‖ ≥ ‖p(R′i ) − xi‖. (4)
Case 1. p(R′i ) ∈ conv(p(Ri ), z˜i )
Then, ‖p(Ri )− p(R′i )‖ > ‖p(Ri )− z˜i‖ = ‖p(Ri )−xi‖. Hence, p(R′i ) ∈ L(Ri , x)
and by R′i ∈ MT(Ri , x), p(R′i ) ∈ L(R′i , x). Hence, xi = p(R′i ) and by (2), xi = yi .
Case 2. p(R′i ) ∈ conv(p(Ri ), z˜i )
Then, by strict convexity, ‖p(Ri ) − z˜i‖ = ‖p(Ri ) − p(R′i )‖ + ‖p(R′i ) − z˜i‖
(4)≥
‖p(Ri ) − p(R′i )‖ + ‖p(R′i ) − xi‖
(∗)≥ ‖p(Ri ) − xi‖, where (∗) follows from the tri-
angular inequality. However, since ‖p(Ri ) − z˜i‖ = ‖p(Ri ) − xi‖, (∗) is an equality
and by strict convexity, p(R′i ) ∈ conv(p(Ri ), xi ). Hence, xi = z˜i .
If p(R′i ) ∈ conv(p(Ri ), yi ), then, by strict convexity, ‖p(Ri ) − yi‖ < ‖p(Ri ) −
p(R′i )‖+ ‖p(R′i )− yi‖
(4)= ‖p(Ri )− p(R′i )‖+ ‖p(R′i )− xi‖ = ‖p(Ri )− xi‖. Thus,‖p(Ri ) − yi‖ < ‖p(Ri ) − xi‖; contradicting (3). Hence, p(R′i ) ∈ conv(p(Ri ), yi ).
But then, (2) and (3) together imply, xi = yi .
To summarize, we have proven that for any y ∈ L(Ri , x) ∩ U (R′i , x), it follows
that yi = xi . Hence, preferences that are induced by a strictly convex norm satisfy
Condition R2. unionsq
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Corollary 4 Let A such that for all i ∈ N, Ai ⊆ Rm and F be given. Let R be a
domain of preferences that are induced by a strictly convex norm and let rule ϕ be
defined on RN .
(a) If ϕ is strategy-proof, then it is unilaterally monotonic.
(b) Let F determine a public goods economy. If ϕ is strategy-proof, then it is Maskin
monotonic.
Remark 4 Examples of preferences induced by a strictly convex norm are symmetric
single-peaked preferences (over Ai ⊆ Rm) and separable quadratic preferences (over
Ai ⊆ Rm).
As mentioned previously (see also Footnote 9), the p norm over Ai ⊆ Rm is
strictly convex for p > 1. A natural question to ask is whether the strictness of the
convex norm is really needed for Proposition 2. Some evidence that this is the case
can be obtained from the 1 or “taxicab” norm, which is convex, but not strictly so: the
preference domain induced by the taxicab norm violates Condition R2 (incidentally,
this preference domain also violates Condition R1). An example is available upon
request. 
We now turn our attention to the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem and its extensions.
4.3 An extended Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem
To conclude the section, we now state some immediate consequences of Theorems 1
and 2, and Corollaries 1 and 2.
Theorem 3 An Extension of the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem
Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Conditions R1 and R2 and let rule ϕ be defined
on RN .
(a) Then, ϕ is unilaterally monotonic if and only if it is strategy-proof.
(b) Let F determine a public goods economy. Then, ϕ is Maskin monotonic if and
only if it is strategy-proof.
(c) Then, ϕ is Maskin monotonic if and only if it is strategy-proof and non-bossy.
Theorem 3 states an extension of the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem that covers
both the public goods and the private goods case. Items (a) and (c) establish that
the only monotonicity condition equivalent to strategy-proofness in a private goods
model is the unilateral monotonicity condition. As Corollary 2 made clear, for prefer-
ence domains satisfying both R1 and R2, only a subset of the set of strategy-proof rules
coincide with the set of Maskin monotonic rules, namely the set of strategy-proof rules
that satisfy non-bossiness. Because non-bossiness is vacuous in public goods mod-
els, item (c) directly implies item (b). The equivalence between Maskin monotonicity
and strategy-proofness as stated in the original version of the Muller–Satterthwaite
Theorem can thus be obtained only for public goods models.
Corollary 5 The Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem
Let A and F be given such that F determines a public goods economy. Let rule ϕ be
defined on the Arrovian preference domain RA. Then, ϕ is Maskin monotonic if and
only if it is strategy-proof.
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Next, we show that the conclusion of the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem is not
only limited to the Arrovian preference domain; Theorem 3 has bite for various sin-
gle-peaked preference domains. A first example is the domain of strict single-peaked
preferences over Ai ⊆ R or the domain of strict single-peaked preferences defined
on a finite set of alternatives. Indeed, preferences being single-peaked implies Condi-
tion R1 and preferences being strict implies Condition R2.
Finally, we introduce a new “Muller–Satterthwaite preference domain”. Suppose
that a public facility, e.g., a phone booth is to be located on a street that is very safe
on one end of the street and becomes more and more dangerous when moving toward
the other end of the street. Then, it is natural to assume that agents’ preferences are
single-peaked (the phone booth in front of one’s house would be best) and prefer any
location in the safer part of the street to a location in the more dangerous part of the
street. The following preference domain describes the situation when the street is very
safe on its “left side” and becomes more dangerous toward its “right side”.15
Left-right single-peaked preferences over Ai ⊆ R: Preferences Ri over Ai ⊆ R are
left-right single-peaked if Ri is single-peaked over Ai ⊆ R with peak p(Ri ) ∈ Ai
and such that for all xi , yi ∈ Ai satisfying xi ≤ p(Ri ) < yi , xi Pi yi .
Note that any left-right single-peaked preference relation is uniquely defined by its
peak.
Proposition 3 Left-right single-peaked preferences satisfy Conditions R1 and R2.
Proof Note that the domain of left-right single-peaked preferences only contains strict
preferences and therefore satisfies Condition R2. In order to verify Condition R1, let
Ri be a left-right single-peaked preference relation and assume that x, y ∈ A such that
y Pi x . Consider the left-right single-peaked preference relation R′i with p(R′i ) = yi .
By the definition of left-right single-peaked preferences:
(i) if xi > p(Ri ), then L(Ri , x) = A ∩ [x,∞) = L(R′i , x);
(ii) if xi ≤ p(Ri ), then xi < yi ≤ p(Ri ) and
L(Ri , x) = A ∩ ((−∞, x] ∪ [p(Ri )1,∞)) ⊆ A ∩ ((−∞, x] ∪ [y,∞)) =
L(R′i , x).
Hence, y ∈ b(R′i ) and L(Ri , x) ⊆ L(R′i , x). Thus, the domain of left-right single-
peaked preferences also satisfies Condition R1. unionsq
Similarly, we can define the domain of right-left single-peaked preferences over
Ai ⊆ R by assuming that the street is very safe on its “right side” and becomes more
dangerous toward its “left side”.
4.4 Conclusion
We conclude by summarizing which conditions our single-peaked preference domains
satisfy (or not) in Table 1 below. We briefly explain how the cells in the table are
filled.
15 We thank Bernardo Moreno for suggesting this type of preference domain.
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Table 1 Preference Domains and Conditions R1 and R2
Preference Domain(s) of Condition R1 Condition R2
Arrovian preferences Yes Yes
Strict single-peaked preferences over Ai ⊆ R Yes Yes
Left-right single-peaked preferences over Ai ⊆ R Yes Yes
Right-left single-peaked preferences over Ai ⊆ R Yes Yes
Symmetric single-peaked (Euclidean) preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm No Yes
Separable quadratic preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm No Yes
Strict convex norm induced preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm No Yes
Single-peaked preferences over Ai ⊆ R Yes No
Single-peaked preferences over Ai ⊆ R reflecting an outside option Yes No
Single-plateaued preferences over Ai ⊆ R Yes No
DHM preferences over Ai ⊆ R Yes No
Convex star-shaped preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm Yes No
Star-shaped preferences over Ai ⊆ Rm No No
Consider the first block formed by preference domains satisfying both Conditions
R1 and R2. For the first two preference domains condition R2 is immediate since
preferences are strict (Remark 2). The implication for Condition R1 is also immediate
for the Arrovian preference domain while the conclusion for the strict single-peaked
preference domain can be derived similarly as in Proposition 1 (i.e., the construction
of preferences R′i in the proof is similar, but for (iv) instead of star-shapedness one
ensures strictness of R′i ). Proposition 3 establishes that both conditions are satisfied
for the left-right and right-left single-peaked preference domains.
Next, take the second block formed by preference domains violating Condition R1
but satisfying Condition R2. By Proposition 2, the three preference domains in this
block satisfy Condition R2. By Theorem 1 and Examples 5 and 6, the domain of
symmetric single-peaked preferences violates Condition R1. It is easy to see that both
examples can be extended to the separable quadratic preference domains and, more
generally, to the strict convex norm induced preference domains (by choosing two
points c1, c2 ∈ Ai ⊆ Rm such that ‖c1‖ < ‖c2‖). Hence, these domains also violate
Condition R1.
Consider now the third block formed by preference domains satisfying Condi-
tion R1 but violating Condition R2. By Remark 3 all these preference domains satisfy
Condition R1. By Theorem 2 and Examples 3 and 4, the domain of single-peaked
preferences over Ai ⊆ R violates Condition R2. Note that the next three preference
domains are supersets of the single-peaked preference domain over Ai ⊆ R. Hence,
by Remark 2, Condition R2 is violated. Finally, it is easy to see that Examples 3 and 4
can be extended to the domain of strict convex star-shaped preferences (by choosing
two points c1, c2 ∈ Ai ⊆ Rm such that ‖c1‖ < ‖c2‖ and choosing one component of
p(Rk)). Hence, this preference domain also violates Condition R2.
The last argument can also be used to show that the domain of star-shaped prefer-
ences violates Condition R2. Finally, Example 8 shows that the star-shaped preference
domain violates Condition R1.
As a final remark, we would like to mention that our analysis and results are for
single-valued rules. It might be interesting to see in how far our results can be extended
to multi-valued rules/correspondences.
123
62 B. Klaus, O. Bochet
Acknowledgments The authors thank William Thomson and two anonymous referees for their very
valuable comments. B. Klaus thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for its
support under grant VIDI-452-06-013. O. Bochet thank the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) and
the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for their support under, respectively, grants
SNF-100014-126954 and VENI-451-07-021.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
A Appendix: Richness conditions
First, we introduce Dasgupta et al.’s (1979) richness condition. A preference domain
is (Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin) rich if it satisfies the following condition.
Condition DHM: Let Ri , R′i ∈ R and x, y ∈ A such that (a) x Ri y ⇒ x R′i y and
(b) x Pi y ⇒ x P ′i y. Then, there exists R′′i ∈ R such that (i) R′′i ∈ MT(Ri , x) and (ii)
R′′i ∈ MT(R′i , y).
Maskin (1985) called the Dasgupta et al. (1979) rich preference domain monoton-
ically closed. Note that Condition DHM does not imply Condition R1. For instance,
strictly monotonic preference domains satisfying Condition DHM do not satisfy Con-
dition R1.16 On the other hand, all the preference domains satisfying Condition R1
that we look at in the paper satisfy Condition DHM, but in general Condition R1 does
not imply Condition DHM.17
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1997) also use a preference domain richness condition
under the name of strict monotonic closedness. Their rich preference domain satisfies
the following condition.
Condition FM: Let Ri , R′i ∈ R and x, y ∈ A such that (a) x Pi y. Then, there exists
R′′i ∈ R such that for all z ∈ A, z = x, y, (i) x R′i z implies x P ′′i z, (ii) y Ri z implies
y P ′′i z, and (iii) [not x I ′′i y].
Note that Conditions R1 and FM are logically independent. The preference domain
of single-plateaued preferences over Ai ⊆ R is rich according to Condition R1, but
not according to Condition F M [on the single-plateaued preference domain it might
not be possible to satisfy Condition FM (iii)]. On the other hand, strictly monotonic
domains satisfying Condition FM do not satisfy Condition R1.
Finally, we consider Le Breton and Zaporozhets’s (2009) rich preference domain
condition.
Condition LBZ: Let Ri ∈ R and x, y ∈ A such that y Pi x and y ∈ b(R¯i ) for some
R¯i ∈ R, there exists R′i ∈ R such that y ∈ b(R′i ) and for all z with zi = xi such that
x Ri z, x P ′i z.
16 A preference domain R is strictly monotonic with respect to Ai , |Ai | = ∞, if for each Ri ∈ R, and
each xi , yi ∈ Ai with yi > xi , yi Pi xi .
17 Let Ai = {x, y, a, b} and R = {R, R′, R1, R2, R3, R4} with a Pi x Ii y Pi b, b P ′i x I ′i y P ′i a,
a I 1i x P
1
i y P
1
i b, a I
2
i y P
2
i x P
2
i b, b I
3
i x P
3
i y P
3
i a, b I
4
i y P
4
i x P
4
i a. Then, R satisfies Condi-
tion R1 (R1, R2, R3, R4 serve to “complete” preferences R, R′ to establish Condition R1), but violates
Condition DHM (e.g., for R, R′ and x, y).
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While, Condition LBZ implies Condition R1, the converse is not true. Observe that
Condition LBZ requires that L(Ri , x) \ {x} ⊆ SL(R′i , x); a stronger requirement than
L(Ri , x) ⊆ L(R′i , x) imposed by Condition R1. Condition LBZ requires sufficient
degrees of freedom to undo at R′i the possible indifferences with respect to x present
at Ri .18 On the other hand, all the preference domains satisfying Condition R1 that
we look at in the article satisfy Condition LBZ.
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